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STATE ME NT OF THE CASE

This is Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant City of McCall's (the "City") reply brief
in support of its cross-appeal of the district court's decision denying the City's request for
attorney fees. This brief responds to Appellants/Cross-Respondents' Reply Brief(hereinafter

"Greystone 's Reply Brief") filed by Appellants Richard Hehr and Greystone Village, LLC
(collectively, "Grey stone") on June 15, 2012, and refers also to Appellants' Brief (hereinafter

"Greystone 's Opening Brief') filed on April25, 2012. The City's Response Brief on its crossappeal was included as part of Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief("City's Response Brief")
filed on May 18,2012.
Greystone contends that the City's cross-appeal should be denied because, even though
its case was dismissed, it did not pursue its claims frivolously or unreasonably. Greystone 's

Reply Brief at 19. Further, Greystone asserts (without explanation) that the City did not provide
adequate support for the amount of fees claimed below. Greystone 's Reply Brief at 19-20. We
will briefly discuss each in turn. The discussion concerning the City's entitlement to fees under
Idaho Code § 12-117 will necessarily touch on some of the legal issues raised in the parties'
other briefs in this appeal, because the standard for an award of fees under that statute is whether
"the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law."
ARGUMENT

I.

THERE IS NO DISPUTE AS TO THE STANDARDS GOVERNING ATTORNEY FEE
AWARDS.

As discussed in prior briefing, City's Response Brief at 45-46, recent cases have held that
if Idaho Code § 12-117 is available, it is exclusive. Idaho Code § 12-121 will come into play
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only if, for some reason, the Court determines that section 12-11 7 is unavailable. In any event,
this Court has equated the standards under these two provisions. Under either provision, the
applicable standard boils down to a requirement that Greystone's pursuit of the litigation be
frivolous. It was, and it remains frivolous.

II.

GREYSTONE'S POSITION ON RESOLUTION
IS UNREASONABLE.

08-11

AND THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT

Greystone claims that "there is an issue of first impression whether a municipality creates
a new claim and a new notice period under the ITCA by resolution." Greystone 's Reply Brief at
19. This claim is without a reasonable foundation in both fact and law.
First, the undisputed facts show that the City did not adopt any resolution that entitled
Greystone to a "refund." Resolution 08-11, upon which Greystone relies for this claim, only
provided for refunds of fees paid under Ordinance 820. The record reflects that Greystone paid
no such fees. Those fees were waived. Greystone may wish that the City had adopted a
resolution providing compensation for persons whose fees were waived, but there was no such
resolution. As a result, Resolution 08-11 does not apply to Greystone and could not have created
a new claim for Greystone.
Greystone does not offer a single citation to authority to support its position that
Resolution 08-11 created a new claim and a new notice period. See Greystone 's Opening Brief
at 31 and Greys tone's Reply Brief at 3-4.

i~~

party cannot be deemed to have created a genuine

"issue of first impression" when Idaho law is clear and there is no legal theory or authority that
even remotely supports that party's argument.

RESPO:'iDE:\T/CROSS-APPELLA:-.T'S REPLY BRIEF O:'i CROSS-APPEAL
1509630 ~ 9, 4432-9

Page 6 of22

Moreover, Greystone fails to explain how the adoption of Resolution 08-11 on April 24,
2008 helps it meet the 180-day deadline set by the Idaho Tort Claim Act ("ITCA"), Idaho Code
§ 6-906, together with Idaho Code§ 50-219. Even if that resolution applied to Greystone and
created a new cause of action that re-started the 180-day clock, Greystone missed the new
deadline, too. Greystone did not submit anything remotely resembling a notice under the ITCA
until its Refund Request Form was submitted on November 25, 2009-considerably more than
180 days later.
The lack of merit in Greystone's claim on this issue is further reflected in Greystone 's

Reply Brief at 3. Greystone calls the City's argument that Greystone did not pay any fees under
Ordinance 820 "nothing short of silly." But Greystone's own statements in its Refund Request
Form demonstrate that Greystone recognized that it had paid no such fees. Greystone's refund
request clearly related solely to the original conveyance of the lots to the City. Its refund request
contains no claim for fees waived by the City: "Nine single family lots had to be given to the
City of McCall in order to get approval and entitlements for Greystone Village. This was not
voluntary on my part. Appraised value at the time was $1,340,000.00." Groenevelt Aff, Exh. Y.
Greystone's claim that Resolution 08-11 applied to it and created a new notice period is
without factual or legal foundation. Instead, it is a transparent, desperate, and frivolous attempt
to avoid the statutory notice requirement. Pursuing its state claims in the face ofthis obvious
jurisdictional bar can only be described as frivolous.
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Although it did not pursue its quasi-estoppel theory on appeal, 1 Greystone's pursuit of
that baseless defense at the district court also reinforces the justification for an award of attorney
fees.

III.

GREYSTONE'S POSITION ON THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS LACKS A
REASONABLE BASIS IN LAW.

The district court also held that the Greystone' s state law claims were barred by the fouryear statute of limitations. Greystone's argument in support ofthe district court's decision to
deny the City's request for fees is that the district court "misapplied the accrual standard for
Greystone's takings claims .... " Greystone 's Reply Brief at 19. In fact, the district court
applied this Court's precedent correctly, while Greystone ignored or misconstrued it. Failure to
address controlling appellate decisions and failure to address factual or legal findings ofthe
district court equates to pursuing litigation without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Waller v.
State o.f Idaho, Dep 't of Health and Welfare, 146 Idaho 234, 240, 192 P.3d 1058, 1064 (2008).

First, Greystone persists in contending that its claim based upon the contribution of the
lots to the City did not accrue until it actually deeded the lots to the City rather than, as found by
the district court, the date upon which the Development Agreement was signed. The language
used by the district court amply demonstrates that Greystone ignored settled precedent on this
ISSue:

1

Greystone initially framed its ITCA defense under the rubric of quasi-estoppel. R. Vol.
II, pp. 252-55. The district court readily disposed of this frivolous argument, relying on City of
Eagle v. Idaho Dep 't of Water Resources, 150 Idaho 449, 247 P.3d 1037 (2011), among other
authorities. R. Vol. II, p. 363-65.
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•

"The Development Agreement clearly sets forth that the agreement expressly and
unequivocally mandated the conveyance of the nine lots when it contained
language 'Greystone Village shall deed to the City of McCall nine affordable
housing lots located along McCall A venue and shown on the plat for Greystone
Village as Phase III."' R. Vol. II, p. 366.

•

"It was abundantly apparent to the Plaintiffs that they were, by the Development

Agreement, transferring these lots to the City. [Citations omitted.]" !d.
(Emphasis supplied.)
•

"It was clear that the Plaintiffs had an actionable claim even before the signing of

the Development Agreement based upon the record before the Court." !d.
(Emphasis supplied.)
•

"In this case, the Plaintiffs certainly knew what their damages were when they
signed the Development Agreement on July 16, 2006." R. Vol. II, p. 367
(emphasis supplied).

Greystone's stubborn and unreasonable insistence that its claim did not accrue until it
deeded the lots to the City, while also claiming to recognize the applicable test-that its inverse
condemnation claim accrued "as of the time that the full extent of the plaintiff's loss of use and
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enjoyment of the property becomes apparent" 2-ignores that this Court has previously rejected
the date of payment as being the date of accrual, where the impairment became apparent earlier.
The clearest example ofthis is Harris v. State, ex ref. Kempthorne, 147 Idaho 401,210
P .3d 86 (2009), in which this Court ruled that the statute of limitations on inverse condemnation
ran from the day the plaintiffs were compelled to enter into a mineral lease with the State, not the
time they made payments to the State under the lease. "We affirm the district court's
determination that the full extent of the Harrises' loss ofuse and enjoyment ofthe property
became apparent when they entered into the Mineral Lease. At that point in time, the
impairment constituted a substantial interference with their property interest because they signed
an agreement promising to pay royalties and rents on the sand and gravel. Therefore, the
Harrises are barred from recovering under their inverse condemnation claim by I.C. § 5-224."

Harris, 147ldaho at 405,210 P.3d at 90 (emphasis supplied).
Greystone has never provided any applicable authority or cogent argument in response to
the holding in Harris that the statute of limitations runs from the date of the execution of the
agreement that imposes the obligation rather than from the date of the payment made pursuant to
the agreement. The district court's statement that "[t]his case presented a number of challenging
legal issues regarding which statute of limitations applied, when the cause of action accrued, and
whether the Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their remedies as set out in the case of KMST, LLC v.

2

McCuskey v. Canyon City Comm 'rs ("McCuskey II"), 128 Idaho 213, 217, 912 P.2d
100, 104 (1996) (quoting Intermountain West, Inc. v. Boise City, 111 Idaho 878, 880, 728 P.2d
767, 769 (1986) and citing Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d 1001, 1005
(1979)) (emphasis supplied)).
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County ofAda, 138 Idaho 577 (2003)" contradicts its statements set forth above concerning the
accrual date.
Greystone's second basis for challenging the district court's decision on the statute of
limitations is equally unreasonable. Greystone argues that the Court should extend the reasoning
underlying the project completion rule from C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 139
Idaho 140, 75 P.3d 194 (2003) to its claim. However, the bases for this Court's adoption ofthe
project completion rule have no application here-a fact that was recognized by the district court
and which is not addressed by Greystone. In C&G, the Court found that the project completion
rule was the proper standard in construction project cases because the landowner should not be
required to prematurely bring a claim before damages can be assessed, which would risk
piecemeal litigation and the risk of res judicata. 139 Idaho at 144, 75 P.3d 194, 198. Here, as
observed by the district court, Greystone knew what its alleged damages were when it signed the
Development Agreement-indeed, well before that. R. Vol. II, p. 367. Greystone fails to
explain how setting the date for accrual at the time of the conveyance of the lots rather than the
execution of the Development Agreement (or earlier-when Greystone became aware that it
would be expected to provide community housing) is contrary to the goals of promoting judicial
economy and creating certainty. The C&G Court expressly limited the project completion rule
to construction projects and affirmed that the Tibbs standard continued to apply to all other
inverse condemnation claims. 139 Idaho at 144, 75 P.3d 194, 198. Applying the Tibbs standard
to this type of claim is not difficult. Nor is it "inherently arbitrary" as described by Greystone.

Greystone 's Reply Brief at 7.
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The record supports the conclusion that Plaintiffs ignored settled precedent regarding the
applicable statute of limitations and therefore unreasonably and frivolously pursued this
litigation.

IV.

GREYSTONE'S PURSUIT OF ITS FEDERAL CLAIMS WAS FRIVOLOUS AS WELL.

A.

Williamson Counzyripeness

As stated by the district court, Greystone did not object to the Development Agreement,
which means that there was no final decision under the first prong of Williamson County

Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). The
requirement to obtain a final decision from the government concerning a development
application was clear before Greystone ever filed suit. While Williamson County dealt with a
party's failure to seek a variance, the rule plainly applies here to require Greystone to obtain a
final decision concerning whether the City would have approved its applications without any
community housing provision.
Throughout this proceeding and even in its reply brief, Greystone fails to grapple with
this precedent and all the cases that have followed. Greystone says, "The Framers did not state
in the Fifth Amendment that just compensation for the taking of property must be paid so long as
the property owner first objects to the taking." Greystone 's Reply Brief at 15. The Framers may
not have said it, but this Court did. In KN!ST, LLC v. County ofAda, 138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56
(2003), the Court recognized that a foundational premise of any taking claim is that the
plaintiffs action not be voluntary. Greystone's failure to raise any objection or even inquiry as
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to whether the donation of the lots was a prerequisite of develpment approval renders the case
unripe under Williamson County.
Greystone also frivolously brushes aside precedent under prong two of Williamson

County. In all its briefing to this Court, Greystone does not even mention Pascoag Reservoir &
Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2003), which established that failure to bring a
timely state inverse condemnation claim in state court results in forfeiture of the federal claim
(because the federal claim can never be ripened). See City's Response Brief at 43-44.
B.

Two-year statute of limitations

Even ifGreystone's claim were ripe under Williamson County, Greystone's pursuit of its
federal claims is patently and inexcusably tardy under the applicable two-year statute of
limitations. (For that matter, it is tardy even under a four-year statute of limitations, but the error
is all the more egregious given the two-year statute.)
As the Ninth Circuit said: "Thus, ... Hacienda's claim ... will either fail because it is
not ripe, or, if it is ripe, it will be barred by the statute of limitations." Hacienda Valley Mobile

Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651,655 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1041
(2004 and 2005) (two petitions for certiorari denied) (citing Levald, Inc. v. City ofPalm Desert,
998 F.2d 680, 688 (9th Cir. 1993)). The same is true here. There may be room for discussion as
to which hurdle would trip up its case. But there was simply no way that Greystone could
overcome all of the hurdles to its federal claims.
It does not matter a great deal whether the two-year or four-year statute of limitations

applies, because Greystone met neither. Yet Greystone continues to insist that it can bring its
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federal claim directly under the federal Constitution (notwithstanding Azul-Pacifica, Inc. v. City

ofLos Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1081 (1993) and all the
cases subsequent) and that doing so means it can escape the two-year statute of limitations.
This is a complete disconnect. Federal precedent controls here and federal courts have
ruled consistently that the two-year statute of limitations applies whether the federal claim is
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or directly under the Constitution. Bieneman v. City ofChicago,
864 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1988) (direct takings claim subject to two-year statute) and Van Strum v.

Lawn, 940 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Bieneman in Ninth Circuit in non-takings case).
Greystone blithely ignores this precedent and continues to make incredible statements like this:
"In this case, the most analogous state statute for Greystone's Fifth Amendment federal inverse
claim is the four (4) year statute of limitations found in Idaho Code section 5-224." Greys tone's

Reply Brief at 5.
V.

GREYSTONE'S POSITION THAT ITS "ROAD AND UTILITY IMPROVEMENTS CLAIM"
IS A SEPARATE CLAIM NOT SUBJECT TO THE SAME DEFENSES IS UNREASONABLE.

The City has pointed out that its Motion for Summary Judgment covered all of
Greystone's claims, and that Greystone's response never differentiated between the claims
related to the conveyance of the lots and the improvements. City's Response Brief at 36. Indeed,
references to the deeds and the improvements are combined throughout the First Amended

Complaint (R. Vol. 1, pp. 6-1 0), supporting the conclusion that these are not separate claims at
all.
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In a desperate scramble to salvage some piece of its case through this "separate claim"
theory, Greystone misrepresents the record. Greystone alleges that once the City became the
owner of the lots, there was no expectation on Greystone's part that it was obligated to construct
the public improvements for those lots. Greystone 's Reply Brief at 3. This assertion is made
without citation to the record. In fact, it is utterly without support in any of the affidavits filed by
Greystone in opposition to the City's A1otion for Summary Judgment. Further, it is flatly
contradicted by the record in this action which shows that the construction of all roads and
utilities was part of the application for the subdivision, regardless of who would end up owning
any of the individual lots. See Groenevelt Aff., Exh. A, p. 5 (application listing anticipated
improvements including streets, sewer, and drainage); McCall Subdivision Ordinance§§ 3-21250 to 3-21-260 (Exh. C to City's Response Brief).
Greystone goes on to state that the obligation to construct improvements was not
addressed in the Development Agreement. Greystone 's Reply Brief at 3. This, too, is false.
Article III of the Development Agreement provides that "Greystone Village shall be responsible
for 100% ofthe cost of construction ofthe Sewer Service Connections." Article IV states that
"Greystone Village shall be responsible for 100% of the cost of construction of the Fire
Hydrants." Article V describes the infrastructure that "[t]he applicant shall construct/provide"
including "street, drainage, water, sewer, and landscaping improvements .... " 3 Groenevelt Aff.,
Exh. R, pp. 1-2.

3

Technically, Paragraph 5.1.4 only obligates Greystone to submit construction drawings
for the improvements. But, Paragraph 5.2 states that "Greystone Village shall be constructed as
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Perhaps most troubling are Greystone's representations that "the City's own staff
questioned whether Greystone was responsible for building roads and running utilities to Jots it
did not own" and that the requirement to construct infrastructure was a "later and separate act"
by the City. Greystone 's Reply Brief at 3. These are both patently false. The email written by
Michelle Groenevelt (Greystone's source for the first statement) clearly reflects that the inquiry
concerning Greystone's responsibility for road improvements on McCall Avenue came from
Richard Hehr, who was "trying to fill in the information gaps" because Steve Benad was no
longer part of the project and Mr. Hehr had a new partner. Via the email, Ms. Groenevelt passed
Mr. Hehr' s question on to former City Manager Roger Millar for his input. Ms. Groenevelt
included her own conclusion which was that the phases of Greystone Village were considered a
single project making the developer responsible for all of the improvements and that the
"construction drawings/final plat show these improvements." R. Vol. II, p. 385. Mr. Millar
confirmed Ms. Groenevelt's understanding: "Greystone Village subdivided property and then
gave platted Jots to the City. Part of subdivision is providing infrastructure to the lots being
created. The engineering plans reflect this. It was theirs to do when they planned on selling the
Jots and still theirs to do with the donation." ld. These same statements also reflect that there

shown on the plans attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit 'C' ." Groenevelt Aff.,
Exh. R, p 3. In addition, one of the City Council's findings supporting the approval of the
Greystone Village final plan states: "The applicant shall submit construction drawings for street,
snow storage, drainage, water, sewer, and landscaping improvements to the City with the final
plat application. The City Engineer approved construction plans and final plat/plan for Phase I
and II." Groenevelt Aff., Exh. Q, p. 7. The clear import of these provisions is that the developer
was obligated to build the subdivision infrastructure.
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was no "later and separate act" by the City related to the infrastructure. All such requirements
were part of the approved subdivision.
The district court was correct to dispose of this argument in a single paragraph on
obvious grounds-that Plaintiffs did not set the infrastructure claims out separately in the First
Amended Complaint and the City "specifically sought dismissal of all of Plaintiffs' claims in its

Motion for Summary Judgment," meaning that the infrastructure "claims" were encompassed in
its prior ruling granting summary judgment to the City. Greystone's arguments regarding its
infrastructure claims are without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
VI.

GREYSTONE'S POSITION REGARDING THE VOLUNT ARINESS OF THE
CONVEYANCE OF THE LOTS IS UNREASONABLE.

Greystone seeks to avoid an award of fees by insisting that the record shows a material
factual dispute as to whether its contribution of the lots for community housing was voluntary.
To this end, Greystone harps on the affidavits from Mr. Hehr and his agents that state, many
years later, that they perceived the contribution to be mandatory despite the fact that Ordinance
819 did not apply to them. It is not necessary to evaluate whether such statements are credible.
Even if these after-the-fact mental impressions were accurate, they cannot overcome undisputed
facts in the record meeting the objective legal test for voluntariness under KMST, LLC v. County
ofAda, 138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003).

It is undisputed that Ordinance 819 did not apply to Greystone and that no ordinance
compelled Greystone to convey the Jots. R. Vol. II, p. 368. It is also undisputed that Greystone
signed a Development Agreement under which it agreed to convey property valued at over a
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million dollars to the City, securing in exchange only an assurance that the City would waive any
additional fees (which might have amounted to a few thousand dollars) under Ordinance 820.
The City's findings and conclusions approving Greystone's applications consistently and
repeatedly recite that Greystone was not required to provide a Community Housing Plan.
Groenevelt Aff., Exhs. P and Q; see also Statement ofFacts in City's Response Briefat 9-12.
These are matters of public record, which Greystone never sought to correct. Instead, the
developers stood for pictures with the Mayor and accepted the praise of the City and the media
for their contribution. Groenevelt Aff, Exh. T.
At best, there is a factual dispute concerning whether the original proposal for Greystone
to contribute toward community housing originated with Greystone or was suggested by the
City. But this does not matter. Either way, the fact is that Greystone chose to sign the agreement
without reservation or objection. This makes it voluntary within the meaning of KMST and
makes Greystone' s prosecution of this action unreasonable.

VII.

IN ADDITION, GREYSTONE FAILED TO SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW.

On appeal, the City has emphasized another basis for dismissing Greystone' s case-its
failure to seek judicial review under the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA"). City's
Response Brief at 13-14. Although this issue was presented only glancingly below-it is, of
course, a jurisdictional issue that may be raised at any time-it only adds to the list of reasons
that Greystone's case was a non-starter.
For example, Greystone's contention in Greystone 's Reply Brief at 9 (that "[t]he takings
claims raised by Greystone in this lawsuit likewise have nothing to do with a 'permit' under
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LLUPA") is frivolous. The requirements to deed lots and construct infrastructure that Greystone
alleges are illegal were imposed pursuant to approval of a subdivision and a planned unit
development, which are appealable actions under LLUPA. Terrazas v. Blaine City ex rel. Bd. of

Comm 'rs, 147 Idaho 193, 197, 207 P.3d 169, 173 (2009) ("The decision regarding a subdivision
application is a decision granting a permit, I.C. § 67-6513, and is therefore subject to judicial
review.") (citing Johnson v. Blaine City, 146 Idaho 916,920-21,204 P.3d 1127, 1131-32
(2009) ); Noble v. Kootenai City, 148 Idaho 93 7, 940, 231 P .3d 1034, 103 7 (20 10) (citing
Terrazas). Greystone ignores this settled precedent and fails to grapple with the obvious fact that

its planned unit development and subdivision approvals were appealable. Obviously an
applicant may appeal not only denial of a permit but granting of a permit with unacceptable
conditions. Idaho Code § 67 -6519(4) (permit appealable if "applicant denied a permit or
aggrieved by a decision"). 4
Greystone's citation (Greystone 's Reply Brief at 8) to Idaho Code§ 67-6521(2)(b) is
specious as well. Again, Greystone ignores precedent. Specifically, it ignores this Court's
explanation of that provision, which shows that it does not apply to all regulatory takings actions.
Rather, as this Court has said, "[i]t only applies if the basis of the inverse condemnation claim is
that a specific zoning action or permitting action restricting private property development is
actually a regulatory action by local government deemed necessary to complete the development
of the material resources of the state, or necessary for other public uses." K}vfST, LLC v. County

4

This is from the statute prior to the 2010 amendment to LLUPA. House Bill 605,2010
Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 175, effective March 31, 2010. The same result obtains after the 2010
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ofAda, 138 Idaho 577, 583, 67 P.3d 56, 62 (2003) (internal quotations omitted). 5 This is a
regulatory takings case, not an eminent domain case in which the plaintiff alleges that the
government action is not for a public purpose.
In sum, Greystone's ineffective defense of its failure to appeal under LLUPA is yet
another example of its frivolous pursuit of this case.

VIII.

THE CITY ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED ITS REQUEST FOR FEES BELOW.

Greystone complains that the City did not establish that it was entitled to the amount of
fees that it incurred below. Greystone 's Reply Brief at 20, citing R. Vol. IV, pp. 608-613
(objecting to the amount of fees requested on the basis that counsel's rates exceeded the
prevailing rates in Valley County.) The City supported its request for attorney fees with an
affidavit from William Nichols, who has been the city attorney for McCall since 2005.
Mr. Nichols testified in his affidavit that it was necessary to look outside of Valley County to
obtain counsel for the City in this matter due to the subject matter and the existence of conflicts
of interest with local attorneys. R. Vol. III., p. 444. Such testimony is sufficient to establish that
it was reasonable for the City to look to Boise for counsel and that Boise is therefore the proper

amendment.
5

The exemption in 67-6521(2)(b) is expressly tied to the constitutional provision on
eminent domain, Idaho Const., art. I,§ 14, which authorizes condemnation of property for any
"use necessary to the complete development of the material resources of the state," which uses
are "declared to be a public use." This sweeping condemnation power-which may be exercised
not only by the government but by private parties-has been recognized since 1906. Potlatch
Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 88 P. 426 (1906); Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill
Co., 28 Idaho 556, 155 P. 680 (1916), appeal dismissed, 244 U.S. 651. Section 67-6521(2)(b) is
aimed at facilitating challenges to takings that are alleged not to be for a legitimate public use, as
in the famous case of Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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geographical area for consideration of prevailing rates. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746,
750-51, 185 P.3d 258, 262-63 (2008). 6
While the City is confident that the entire amount of fees incurred below is reasonable
and adequately supported, this issue appears to be premature. If the City prevails on its cross
appeal, then a determination of the amount of fees to be awarded at the trial court level would
need to be addressed by the trial court on remand. (Likewise, if the Court awards fees on appeal,
the amount of such fees will be determined pursuant to I.A.R. 41.)
CONCLUSION

In order to show its entitlement to attorney fees, it is not necessary for the City to prevail
on each and every one of its defenses. It need only prevail on one defense for each claim.
Consequently, in order to have a non-frivolous lawsuit, Greystone must have at least a plausible
and reasonable argument on every defense raised by the City. The fact that Greystone "might
win" on one or two of the City's defenses does not justify Greystone in putting the City through
this expensive litigation. Even if Greystone were to pass one hurdle or another (or come close to
doing so), it is clear that Greystone could not overcome all of them. Any reasonable analysis
would lead to the inescapable conclusion that Greystone's claims faced insurmountable
obstacles. Accordingly, Greystone's pursuit of this lawsuit was frivolous, and the Court should
reverse the district court's denial ofthe City's request for attorney fees.

6

It is significant to note that before the trial court, Greystone only cited to the first
Lettunich decision (141 Idaho 425, 111 P.3d 110) and did not even bother to mention this
Court's follow up in Lettunich II, which seems to be directly applicable.
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Respectfully submitted this

6th

day of July, 2012.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
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By
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